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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Case No. 900257-CA 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : Priority No. 2 
RODNEY B. JENSEN, : 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal following a conviction of possession 
of a controlled substance, a third degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1990); possession of drug 
paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-37a-5 (1990) and carrying a concealed dangerous weapon, 
a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-504 
(1990). This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1990). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court correctly find that the 
evidence introduced at trial was sufficient to convict defendant 
of possession of a controlled substance, a third degree felony, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1990)? 
The trial court's interpretation of section 58-37-8 
poses a question of law reviewable for correctness. State v, 
Warner, 788 P.2d 1041, 1042 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
2. Is defendant's sentence constitutionally 
proportionate, under the eighth amendment, to the gravity of the 
offense for which he was convicted? 
This Court must grant substantial deference to the 
legislature and the sentencing court, as 
it is not the role of an appellate court to 
substitute its judgment for that of the 
sentencing court as to the appropriateness of 
a particular sentence; rather# in applying 
the Eighth Amendment the appellate court 
decides only whether the sentence under 
review is within constitutional limits. 
Solem v. Helmf 463 U.S. 277, 290 n.16 (1983); State v. Bishop, 
717 P.2d 261, 269 (Utah 1986). 
3. Did the trial court properly sentence defendant to 
the statutory indeterminate term of from zero to five years? 
This Court will not set aside a sentence unless it 
appears that the trial court abused its discretion, failed to 
consider all legally relevant factors, or the sentence imposed 
exceeded the limits prescribed by law. State v. Gibbons, 779 
P.2d 1133, 1135 (Utah 1989) (citations omitted). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Any relevant text of constitutional, statutory, or rule 
provisions pertinent to the resolution of the issues presented on 
appeal is contained in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Rodney B. Jensen, was charged with 
possession of a controlled substance, a third degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (1990); possession 
of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of 
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Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5 (1990) and carrying a concealed 
dangerous weapon, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. S 76-10-504 (1990) (Record [hereinafter "R."] at 33).X 
Defendant was convicted as charged following a jury trial on 
September 25, 1989 (R. at 102). 
On October 5, 1989, defendant was released on bail 
pending imposition of sentence (R. at 136-37). A bench warrant 
was issued for defendant's arrest and his bail revoked on 
November 9, 1989 after he failed to appear for a hearing (R. at 
140-42). Defendant subsequently appeared before the trial court 
on November 20, 1989 at which time the court ordered a 
presentence report (R. at 141). On December 12, 1989 defendant 
appeared for sentencing and the court ordered a 90-day diagnostic 
evaluation (R. at 146). Defendant filed a memorandum on March 3, 
1990, requesting that he be placed on probation with the 
requirement that he participate in counseling for his alcohol 
and/or drug problem on the grounds that (1) the mitigating 
factors outweighed aggravating factors in his case and (2) a 
prison sentence would constitute cruel and unusual punishment (R. 
at 153). Following completion of the 90-day evaluation on March 
19, 1989, the trial court ordered defendant to be held in the Box 
Elder County Jail pending sentencing (R. at 148, 152). 
Defendant was originally charged with the above counts on 
December 28, 1988 (R. at 2). In an amended information 
subsequently filed January 23, 1989, count II (possession of drug 
paraphernalia) was dropped and count III (carrying a concealed 
dangerous weapon) was reduced to the class B misdemeanor of 
carrying a loaded firearm (R. at 12). However, on March 1, 1989 
the information was amended to again reflect the original charges 
(R. at 33). 
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Defendant was sentenced on April 9, 1990 to a term of 
not more than five years in the Utah State Prison for count I; 
six months in the Box Elder County Jail for count II and one year 
in the Box Elder County Jail for count III, all sentences to run 
concurrently. In addition, defendant was fined $2,000 and 
ordered to pay a surcharge in the amount of $500 as well as 
extradition costs as determined by the Adult Probation and Parole 
Department (R. at 225-26). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant was arrested on December 22, 1988 pursuant to 
a bench warrant that had been issued for his arrest on December 
9, 1988 and taken to the Tremonton City Police Department 
(Transcript of jury trial, 9/25/89 [hereinafter MT.M] at 13-15, 
48-50). During the course of a pat-down search incident to 
defendant's arrest Officer Bill Beckmann discovered that 
defendant, who was wearing a long overcoat at the time, was 
carrying a .32 caliber automatic pistol in a hip holstejr (T. at 
14-15). A further search of defendant's jacket revealed a box of 
.32 caliber cartridges in one pocket (R. at 14-17) and a brown 
cotton bag in another pocket containing a metal straw, mirror, 
razor blade and brown vial with a white powdery substance in it 
(T. at 17, 20).2 
When Officer Beckmann discovered the brown cotton bag in 
defendant's pocket he asked him what it contained and defendant 
explained it was his first aid kit (T. at 17, 116). At trial 
defendant testified that he put the brown cotton bag in his coat 
and that he knew it contained a mirror, bottle and straw, but he 
believed the bottle was empty at the time (T. at 112, 115). 
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A field test performed on a sample of the powdery 
substance in the vial at the station revealed the possible 
existence of a controlled substance (T. 22, 39/ 43). The brown 
bag together with the vial, straw, mirror and razor blade were 
then turned over to Arthur Terkelson at the Weber State College 
Crime Lab for further testing (T. at 62-64). Officer Beckmann 
asked Terkelson to test for the presence of cocaine and 
methamphetamine (T. at 44). Several tests were conducted on 
samples taken from the vial and metal straw which revealed the 
3 
existence of methamphetamine (T. at 67-68, 74). Although 
Terkelson did not weigh the exact amount of substance in the 
vial, he estimated that it contained approximately 15 to 25 
milligrams which constituted "more than just residue" because 
4 
"you can still pour some out" (T. at 75-76, 91-92). 
Terkelson apparently obtained three different samples from the 
vial (T. at 65-67). Using the first sample, he conducted a 
cobalt thiocyanate test which was negative for the presence of 
cocaine (T. at 66). He then took a second sample from the vial 
and performed a marquis test which revealed the presence of 
amphetamine (T. at 66-67). Finally, Terkelson apparently took a 
third sample from the vial for purposes of conducting a gas 
chromatograph which revealed the existence of methamphetamine (T. 
at 67-69). 
In addition to the vial samples, Terkelson obtained a sample 
from residue remaining on both the metal straw and the mirror (T. 
68, 88-89). A marquis test performed on the straw sample 
revealed the presence of amphetamine (T. at 68, 88-89). Along 
with the vial sample, the straw sample was then subjected to a 
gas chromatograph and similarly tested positive for 
methamphetamine (T. at 68, 89). Although Terkelson obtained a 
sample from residue remaining on the mirror, it was simply not 
enough to conduct a successful marquis test and was not subjected 
to the more sensitive gas chromatograph test (T. at 89). 
4 
Terkelson surmised that the substance in the vial was probably 
not 100% pure based on the fact that it appeared consistent with 
illegal lab product (T. at 73, 83). Due to a number of varying 
factors, Terkelson could not say with certainty that the 
At the conclusion of all the evidence defendant made a 
motion to dismiss the charge of possession of a controlled 
substance on the ground that the amount was insufficient to 
establish a third degree felony (T. at 119). The trial court 
denied defendant's motion on the ground that the quantity of 
methamphetamine in his possession was sufficient (T. at 121-122; 
a copy of the trial court's oral findings is attached hereto as 
Addendum A). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Relying primarily upon case law and policies expressly 
rejected by this Court in State v. Warner/ 788 P.2d 1041 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1990)f defendant argues that the 15 to 25 milligrams of 
the controlled substance methamphetamine found in his possession 
is simply insufficient to establish that his possession was 
knowing and intentional. Although this Court has rejected the 
requirement of some specific "usable amount" in order to sustain 
a conviction for possession, this Court has not expressly 
considered whether possession of some particular quantity of 
narcotics might nonetheless be necessary to justify a jury's 
Cont. percentage of methamphetamine remaining in the vial was 
sufficient to cause a physical effect in a particular instance; 
however, he was certain that methamphetamine was present (T. at 
74, 97-98). 
On cross examination defense counsel asked the following 
question: . . . .[W]e don't know how much real amphetamine may 
be in this sample, but it's certainly less than 100 percent of 25 
milligrams or 15 milligrams?" Terkelson responded: "Yes, I 
would agree with that." Defense counsel then asked: "So we 
could be — maybe as low as five to ten milligrams perhaps?" 
Terkelson responded: "Perhaps" (T. at 92). Based on the 
foregoing testimony it is clear that Terkelson's estimation of 
five to ten milligrams went to the possible amount of amphetamine 
contained in the approximately 15 to 25 milligrams of 
methamphetamine he observed in the vial. 
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conclusion that a defendant had knowledge of the presence and 
narcotic character of the drug in his possession. 
Upon review of pertinent case law it appears that the 
quantity of controlled substance becomes vital only in the 
absence of other evidence of intent. See State v. Winters, 16 
Utah 2d 139, 396 P.2d 872, 873-74 (1964) (where drugs were 
discovered inside mattress located in defendant's former cell the 
Utah Supreme Court found the evidence sufficient to justify the 
jury's conclusion that defendant had knowledge of both his 
possession and the narcotic effect of the drug without 
considering the specific amount). The evidence presented at 
defendant's trial was sufficient to establish that he knowingly 
and intentionally exercised dominion and control over the 
methamphetamine found in his possession. Defendant does not 
dispute that he placed a brown bag containing a vial, metal straw 
and mirror in his jacket pocket. The vial contained a clearly 
visible amount of approximately 15 to 25 milligrams of the 
controlled substance methamphetamine. Based on the foregoing 
facts, a jury could reasonably conclude that defendant exercised 
a knowing and intentional possession. 
Where, as here, the controlled substance is clearly 
visible, some courts have found it unnecessary to consider 
whether the record contained other evidence of a knowing and 
intentional possession, relying solely on a visible amount of 
controlled substance to establish the intent element of the 
offense. Under either view, the evidence in this case was 
clearly sufficient to establish defendant's knowing and 
intentional possession of the controlled substance 
methamphetamine. 
Alternatively, defendant attacks his sentence as being 
cruel and unusual under the eighth amendment. However, the 
indeterminate term not to exceed five years which is applicable 
to third degree felonies was clearly proportionate to the gravity 
of defendant's conviction for possession of a controlled 
substance. Furthermore, defendant's sentence falls within 
statutorily imposed limits and thus carries with it a strong 
presumption of constitutionality. Moreover, the record is devoid 
of any indication that the trial court abused its discretion in 
denying defendant's request to be placed on probation and 
imposing the statutory term. This Court should affirm the lower 
court's ruling. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT WAS PROPERLY CONVICTED OF A KNOWING 
AND INTENTIONAL POSSESSION OF THE CONTROLLED 
SUBSTANCE METHAMPHETAMINE. 
Defendant was convicted of possession of a controlled 
substance in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) 
(1987) which provides that it is unlawful "for any person 
knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a controlled 
substance . . . ." He was found to be in possession of a vial 
containing approximately 15 to 25 milligrams of a white powdery 
substance, as well as other drug paraphernalia including a metal 
straw, mirror and razor blade (T. at 21, 75). Tests performed on 
the substance in the vial and on residue collected from the metal 
straw revealed the presence of the controlled substance 
methamphetamine (T. 67-68/ 74-76/ 91). Defendant seeks reversal 
on the ground that the amount of methamphetamine found in the 
vial and metal straw was simply insufficient to demonstrate that 
he knowingly and intentionally possessed a controlled substance 
(Br. of App. at 8-9). In support of his argument defendant urges 
this Court to reconsider its recent opinion in State v. Warner# 
788 P.2d 1041 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)/ and adopt a minority view 
which requires possession of a usable amount of a controlled 
substance. 
At the outset it is important to clarify Utah case law 
on this issue. In Warner, this Court rejected an interpretation 
of section 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) that would have required possession 
of a "usable amount" to sustain a conviction for possession of a 
controlled substance. Id. at 1043-44 (section 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) 
does not require possession of a sufficient quantity of illegal 
substance to cause a physical effect). See State v. Winters# 16 
Utah 2d 139/ 396 P.2d 872, (1964) (the determinative test in Utah 
"is possession of a narcotic drug, and not usability of a 
narcotic drug"). Although both this Court and the Utah Supreme 
Court have clearly rejected the requirement of some specific 
"usable amount" in order to sustain a conviction for possession/ 
neither Warner nor Winters expressly considered whether 
Defendant places primary reliance on policies and case law 
expressly rejected by this Court in Warner, 788 P.2d at 1042-43. 
This position is consistent with the majority of jurisdictions. 
Id. (citing People v. Harrington, 396 Mich. 33f 238 N.W.2d 20/ 25 
(1976); Hampton v. State, 498 So.2d 384f 386 (Miss. 1986); People 
v. Mizell/ 72 N.Y.2d 651/ 536 N.Y.S.2d 21/ 22-23/ 532 N.E.2d 
1249/ 1250-51 (1988)). 
possession of some particular quantity of narcotics might 
nonetheless be necessary to justify a jury's conclusion that a 
defendant had knowledge of the presence and narcotic cheiracter of 
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the drug in his possession. Significantly, both Warner and 
Winters acknowledge that "several courts have held that no 
particular quantity of narcotics is necessary to sustain a 
conviction for possession of a narcotic drug." Warner, 788 P.2d 
at 1043 (quoting Winters, 396 P.2d at 874). In support of this 
position, this Court explained that "[e]ven in jurisdictions that 
advance the majority view that any amount of illegal substance is 
sufficient to make out the offense of possession, the prosecution 
must still prove the essential element of knowledge." Id. at 
1043 n.3 (citing Harrington, 238 N.W.2d at 24 ("It is only when 
these two requirements are present that an individual may be 
found guilty of possession, even by applying the majority 
rule")). Thus, no particular amount of controlled substance is, 
by itself, determinative of a knowing and intentional possession. 
Id. 
This precise question appears to have been left open by this 
Court in Warner and by the Utah Supreme Court in Winters. In 
Warner, this Court expressly noted that the defendant did not 
argue that the State failed to prove he had knowledge of the 
drug's presence and its narcotic character, or that a particular 
minimum quantity of methamphetamine was necessary to prove that 
he "knowingly and intentionally" possessed the drug. Therefore, 
this Court's opinion was limited to a rejection of Warner's 
narrow argument that section 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) implied a "usable 
amount" requirement. 1x1. at 1043. In Winters, the drugs were 
discovered in defendant's former cell inside his mattress; 
therefore, the Utah Supreme Court simply found the evidence 
sufficient to justify the jury's conclusion that defendant had 
knowledge of both his possession and the narcotic effect of the 
drug. Winters, 396 P.2d at 873-74. 
In Warner, this Court attempted to distinguish two 
apparently differing views as to the State's burden of proof on 
the issue of a knowing and intentional possession. Ld. at 1043 
q 
n.3. However, viewing the cases as a whole it appears that the 
quantity of controlled substance becomes vital only in the 
absence of other evidence of intent. See, e.g., Benson, 509 P.2d 
at 556 (when there is present in the record other evidence of 
intent . . . . then all that is needed to sustain a conviction is 
that amount of controlled substance necessary for 
identification); Siirila, 193 N.W.2d at 473 (where traces of 
marijuana were discovered in a jacket shown to belong to 
defendant and to have been worn by him, court found that it was a 
permissible inference that whatever was in the jacket was there 
with his knowledge); Theel, 505 P.2d at 965 (where less than a 
milligram of marijuana was found in three clear plastic baggies 
located in pocket of jacket defendant had borrowed from a friend, 
Without expressing a preference for either view this Court 
noted: 
Some jurisdictions advocate that since 
knowledge may be proven by circumstantial 
evidence, possession alone of a trace or 
minute quantity of contraband infers 
knowledge. See e.g., State v. Siirila, 292 
Minn. 1, 193 N.W.2d 467, 473 (1971), cert. 
denied, 408 U.S. 925, 92 S.Ct. 2503, 33 
L.Ed.2d 336 (1972); People v. Mizell# 72 
N.Y.2d 651, 536 N.Y.S.2d 21, 24, 532 N.E.2d 
1249, 1252 (1988). However, other courts 
have found, to the contrary, that possession 
of a minute amount of illegal drugs alone, is 
insufficient to justify an inference of 
knowledgeable possession. See e.g., State v. 
Theel, 180 Colo. 348, 505 P.2d 964, 965-66 
(1973) (en banc); People v. Hunten, 115 
Mich.App. 167, 320 N.W.2d 68, 70 (1982) (per 
curiam); Sheriff, Clark County v. Benson/ 89 
Nev. 160, 509 P.2d 556 (1973). 
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court found that the record failed to reveal any evidence 
establishing the element of knowledge); Hunten, 320 N.W.2d at 70 
(court found that the amount of controlled substance was not 
visible to the naked eye and that there was nothing in the record 
from which an inference could be drawn that defendant was aware 
g 
of the substance). See Winters, 396 P.2d at 873-74 (where drugs 
were discovered inside mattress located in defendant's former 
cell the Utah Supreme Court simply found the evidence sufficient 
to justify the jury's conclusion that defendant had knowledge of 
both his possession and the narcotic effect of the drug). See 
also Judd v. State, 482 P.2d 273, 280 (Alaska 1971) (where facts 
show knowing possession it is unnecessary that a usable amount 
quantity be found). 
In the present case, it is clear from the record that 
defendant was knowingly and intentionally in possession of the 
controlled substance methamphetamine. The vial was located 
inside defendant's jacket pocket and contained a clearly visible 
amount of approximately 15 to 20 milligrams of methamphetamine 
The Hunten court's determination that there was nothing in the 
record from which an inference of knowledgeable possession could 
be drawn overlooks the fact that the substance was taken from 
drug paraphernalia found inside a secret compartment that had 
been built into the tongue of defendant's shoe while he was an 
inmate at the Muskegon Correctional Facility. Id. at 68. 
Where the controlled substance is determined to be clearly 
visible, some courts hold that there is a sufficient amount to 
infer a knowing and intentional possession. Harrington, 238 
N.W.2d at 27 (mens rea threshold was successfully crossed where 
defendant was found in possession of bottle caps with white 
heroin encrustation apparent to the naked eye); Mizell, 532 
N.E.2d at 1250 (court inferred knowing possession where defendant 
was found in possession of two vials containing visible cocaine 
residue). 
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(T. at 75, 109-112). In addition, defendant admits that he put 
the brown bag in his jacket pocket and that he knew the bag 
contained a mirror, vial and straw (T. at 109-112). He further 
admits that he didn't think there was anything in the bottle at 
the time because he "could have" ingested its contents previously 
(T. at 112-115). Thus, a jury could reasonably conclude from the 
above facts that defendant knowingly and intentionally exercised 
dominion and control over the methamphetamine in the vial. See 
Winters, 396 P.2d at 874 (State "must prove that the accused 
exercised dominion and control over the drug with knowledge of 
its presence and narcotic character"). 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT'S SENTENCE DOES NOT IMPLICATE THE 
EIGHTH AMENDMENT'S PROHIBITION AGAINST CRUEL 
AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT. 
Defendant argues that it was cruel and unusual 
punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution for the trial court to impose a statutory 
indeterminate term not to exceed five years "for an offense 
involving an unusable and valueless amount of methamphetamine" 
(Br. of App. at 19). Defendant's argument is without merit. 
In State v. Bishop, 717 P.2d 261, 269 (Utah 1986), the 
Utah Supreme Court applied a proportionality test to determine 
whether the sentence imposed was proportionate to the crime for 
which the defendant had been convicted. In so doing, the court 
The court balanced three factors in its analysis: 
(i) the gravity of the offense and the 
harshness of the penalty; (ii) the sentences 
imposed on other criminals in the same 
-13-
noted that "[o]nly rarely will a statutorily prescribed 
punishment be so disproportionate to the crime that the 
sentencing statute is unconstitutional." Jd. Because 
"sentencing statutes are necessarily based on numerous, imprecise 
considerations," in Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983), the 
Supreme Court stated that "substantial deference must be accorded 
to the prerogatives of legislative power in 'determining the 
types and limits of punishments for crimes.'" I^d. (quoting Solem 
v. Helmf 463 U.S. at 290). 
In the present case, this Court must grant substantial 
deference to the trial court's imposition of the statutorily 
mandated sentence. Defendant was found guilty of possession of 
approximately 15 to 25 milligrams of the controlled substance 
12 
methamphetamine, possession of which amount the legislature has 
13 classified as a third degree felony. Clearly, defendant's 
sentence falls within prescribed statutory limits and thus 
carries a strong presumption of constitutionality. United States 
v. Newsome, 898 F.2d 119, 122 (10th Cir.) (noting that within the 
strictures of the eighth amendment the determination of proper 
Cont. jurisdiction; and (iii) the 
sentences imposed for the commission of the 
same crime in other jurisdictions. 
Id. (quoting Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 292 (1983)). 
1 2
 See Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-4(2)(b)(iii)(B) (1990). 
1 3
 See Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(b)(ii) (1990). See also Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-3-203(3) (1990) authorizing imposition of an 
indeterminate term not to exceed five years for conviction of a 
third degree felony. Under Utah's Sentence and Release 
Guidelines, defendant could be eligible for parole after having 
served only six months of his sentence, or at the latest after 
having served only 18 months. See form 4, appendix H. 
criminal penalties is a matter for legislative bodies and a 
sentence within the prescribed statutory limits generally will 
not be found to be cruel and unusual), cert* denied, U.S. 
, 111 S.Ct. 207 (1990). 
Notwithstanding the above, defendant appears to argue 
that because the use of illegal substances is prevalent in our 
society, no useful purpose is served by imprisoning arguably 
casual drug offenders and thus the harshness of his prison 
sentence is disproportionate to the gravity of his possession 
conviction (Br. of App. at 20). Contrary to defendant's 
assertion, imposition of an indeterminate term not to exceed five 
years is clearly proportionate to the gravity of the crime for 
14 
which he was convicted. As noted in point I of this brief, 
this Court expressly rejected a policy argument similar to that 
of the defendants in Warner when it refused to read a "usability 
requirement" into Utah's Controlled Substances Act. Id. at 1043 
(rejecting rationale that possession of quantities too small to 
be used do not pose the type of danger the legislature 
contemplated). Other courts similarly recognize that drug 
Because defendant's argument appears to focus solely on the 
first of three factors for determining proportionality set forth 
in Bishop, 717 P.2d at 269, the State likewise limits its 
analysis of defendant's claims to a consideration of whether the 
gravity of the offense is proportionate to the harshness of the 
penalty and assumes defendant has no concerns regarding the 
sentences imposed on other criminals in this jurisdiction or the 
sentences imposed for possession of a controlled substance in 
other jurisdictions. See Br. of App. at 18-19. 
1 5
 Significantly, this Court upheld section 58-37-8(5)(a)(iii) of 
the Controlled Substances Act as constitutional when it was 
challenged on equal protection and due process grounds in State 
v. Stromberg, 783 P.2d 54, 60 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 795 
P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990). The section provides enhanced penalties 
offenses are at the root of some of the gravest problems facing 
our country and note the existence of a strong public policy 
against the illegal use of controlled substances. See, e.g.. 
United States v. Meirovitz, 918 F.2d 1376, 1381 (8th Cir. 1990); 
Newsome, 898 F.2d at 122 (noting the concerns of Congress and 
society about drugs); State v. Wise, 164 Ariz. 574, 795 P.2d 217, 
219 (Ariz. App.) (noting existence of strong public comiriitment to 
eradicating the use of illicit drugs), review denied, Ariz. 
(1990); State v. Anderson, 210 N.J.Super 669, 510 A.2d 332 
(N.J. Super. L. 1986) (finding rational legitimate basis in 
regulatory purposes for dissuading possession and use of drugs 
while operating motor vehicle). In light of the Utah 
legislature's obvious and legitimate concern with prohibiting 
possession of even minute amounts of illicit drugs, together with 
the fact that defendant's sentence falls within legislatively 
prescribed limits, his sentence simply fails to "shock the moral 
sense of all reasonable men as to what is right and proper under 
the circumstances." State v. Russell, 791 P.2d 188, 190 (Utah 
1990) (setting forth test for determining whether punishment is 
cruel and unusual in specific applications). 
Alternatively, defendant appears to assert that the 
trial court failed to afford proper weight to certain factors 
mitigating in favor of his being placed on probation. He further 
asserts that the presentence report was "flawed and erroneous." 
15 
Cont. for convicted drug offenders, whether trafficking or 
not, where the offenses occur in close proximity to schools. In 
upholding the section this Court noted that it was reasonably 
related to the legislative purpose of creating a drug-free 
environment around school children. Id. at 59-60. 
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As a result, defendant argues, he "received a much harsher 
sentence than would be warranted by the objective facts of his 
background and criminal history" (Br. of App. at 18-19). 
The Utah Supreme Court has clearly stated that a 
reviewing court will not overturn the sentence imposed by a lower 
court unless the sentence represents an abuse of discretion, the 
lower court failed to consider all legally relevant factors, or 
the sentence exceeds statutorily imposed limits. State v. 
Gibbons, 779 P.2d 1133, 1135 (Utah 1989) (citations omitted). 
See United States v. Hack, 782 F.2d 862, 870 (10th Cir.) (noting 
that an appellate court is without the proper authority to modify 
or change a sentence merely upon the claim that it is too 
severe), cert, denied, 476 U.S. 1184 (1986). 
In the present case, although defendant attacks the 
criteria the trial court allegedly relied upon in imposing 
sentence at the sentencing hearing, he has failed to include a 
transcript of his sentencing hearing in the record before this 
Court for review. Nor has he provided a copy of his 
presentence report. The record before this Court is otherwise 
devoid of any indication that the trial court employed improper 
assumptions, mechanically imposed sentence or refused to exercise 
its discretion to individualize defendant's sentence. United 
States v. Bonilla Romero, 836 F.2d 39, 47 (1st Cir.) (where 
Although it is apparent from the record that defendant 
requested and the trial court ordered preparation of the 
sentencing transcript to be included in the record on appeal, the 
sentencing transcript has not been included in the record before 
this Court. See R. at 232, 251. 
sentence imposed was not grossly disproportionate to the crime 
committed and was within statutory limits, court found no abuse 
of discretion), cert, denied, 488 U.S. 817 (1988). Where, as 
here, the defendant has failed to see that the record contains 
materials necessary to support his appeal, this Court must assume 
the regularity of the proceedings below and affirm the trial 
court's ruling. State v. Robbins, 709 P.2d 771, 773 (Utah 1985); 
State v. Theison# 709 P.2d 307, 309 (1985) (when crucial matters 
are not included in the record, the missing portions are presumed 
17 to support the action of the trial court). Thus, based on the 
record before this Court, it is reasonable to conclude that the 
trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing defendant 
to the statutory indeterminate term not to exceed five years. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the State of Utah respectfully 
requests that this Court affirm defendant's conviction and 
sentence. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this &?tO day of February, 1991. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Utah Attorney General 
MARIAN DECKER 
Assistant Attorney General 
17 
However, notwithstanding the above, the record before this 
Court provides an adequate factual basis for the sentence 
imposed. On October 5, 1989, defendant was released on bail 
pending imposition of sentence (R. at 136-37). After defendant 
failed to appear for a hearing, a bench warrant was issued for 
his arrest and his bail revoked on November 9, 1989 (R. at 140-
42). Based on defendant's demonstrated inability to comply with 
the conditions of his bail agreement, it cannot reasonably be 
argued that the trial court abused its discretion in denying 
defendant's request that he be placed on probation in lieu of 
serving the statutory term. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of 
the foregoing brief of Appellee were mailed, postage prepaid, to 
John D. Russell, 10 West Broadway, Suite 500, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84101, on this ^t^day of February, 1991. 
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THE COURTS MR. MILLER. 
MR. MILLER! WITH REGARD TO THE POSSESSION OF 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE, THE STATUTE DOES NOT REQUIRE A MINIMUM 
AMOUNT OF A SUBSTANCE THAT A PERSON MUST POSSESS IN ORDER TO 
BE GUILTY. THERE ARE OTHER CHARGES WHICH DO SET A STANDARD OF 
POSSESSION WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE, WHICH CAN BE ESTABLISHED 
BY POSSESSION OF A CERTAIN QUANTITY, BUT THE SIMPLE POSSESSION 
DOES NOT REQUIRE A MINIMUM AMOUNT OF SUBSTANCE IN ORDER TO BE 
FOUND GUILTY. ANY AMOUNT WHICH CAN BE DETERMINED BY 
SCIENTIFIC TESTS TO CONTAIN THE SUBSTANCE IS SUFFICIENT TO 
ESTABLISH THE CHARGE. I WOULD SUBMIT IT ON THAT. 
WITH REGARD TO THE FIREARM CHARGE, ONCE AGAIN, I DISAGREE 
WITH THE INTERPRETATION OF THE STATUTE. THE STATUTE CLEARLY 
MAKES IT A CLASS "A" MISDEMEANOR TO CARRY A LOADED FIREARM 
CONCEALED ON — ANYWHERE, BUT IN THIS CASE ON HIS PERSON. AND 
THE FACT THAT HE WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN OUT OF THE CAR EXCEPT FOR 
THE OFFICER TELLING HIM TO GET OUT OF THE CAR DOESN'T MAKE IT 
ANY LESS OF A CRIME. IT WAS A CRIME WHEN HE WAS IN THE CAR IF 
IT WAS CONCEALED AND LOADED. THE ONLY WAY THAT IT COULD HAVE 
NOT BEEN A CRIME WAS TO HAVE BEEN UNLOADED, AND BEEN IN A 
SECURE PACKAGE OR PARCEL. IT WOULD HAVE BEEN A CLASS "B" 
MISDEMEANOR HAD IT BEEN UNLOADED, BUT IT WAS AND CONCEALED. 
BUT BECAUSE IT WAS CONCEALED AND BECAUSE IT WAS LOADED, IT'S A 
CLASS "A" MISDEMEANOR. AND I SUBMIT IT ON THAT. 
THE COURTS AS TO YOUR FIRST MOTION, COUNSEL, THE 
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COURT'S NOT PREPARED TO SAY THAT QUANTITY IS INSUFFICIENT AS A 
MATTER OF LAW. THE COURT'S FAMILIAR PERSONALLY WITH CASES 
WHERE THE ENTIRE QUANTITY WAS USED UP IN THE ANALYSIS AND THE 
COURT STILL HELD THAT IT'S SUFFICIENT TO SHOW POSSESSION. IN 
THIS CASE, IT'S SIGNIFICANTLY MORE THAN THAT. IN VIEW OF THE 
TESTIMONY THAT THERE IS ENOUGH OF A QUANTITY STILL REMAINING, 
THAT IT'S IDENTIFIABLE, AND IT ISN'T JUST ON THE PERIPHERY 
EDGE OF THE GLASS, I THINK THE TESTIMONY IS THAT WHAT KIND OF 
— WHAT KIND OF OR EVEN THE OBTAINING OF A HIGH WOULD DEPEND 
ON A NUMBER OF FACTORS, THE PURITY, THE QUANTITY, AND ALSO THE 
RECIPIENT. SO THE COURT'S REALLY NOT PREPARED TO GRANT A 
MOTION ON THE BASIS THAT THE EVIDENCE THAT WAS ADDUCED AT 
TRIAL AND THE EVIDENCE ALL BEING IN AT THIS POINT. 
AS TO THE CONCEALED WEAPON QUESTION, I THINK THERE MAY OR 
MAY NOT HAVE BEEN A CRIME EARLIER IN THE CAR, DEPENDING ON HOW 
THE FACTS WERE INTERPRETED AT THAT TIME. BUT THE ONLY 
EVIDENCE BEFORE THE JURY IN THIS COURT IS, WHAT HAPPENED 
OUTSIDE OF THE CAR, AND I THINK THERE IS SUFFICIENT FOR A JURY 
TO MAKE A DETERMINATION ONE WAY OR ANOTHER ON THE RELEVANT 
FACTS THERE OF — ONE, OF THEM BEING WHETHER OR NOT THAT 
VEHICLE WAS — THAT WEAPON WAS LOADED. SO I THINK THERE IS 
SOMETHING FOR THE JURY TO — TO ADDRESS IN THAT, SO I'LL DENY 
BOTH OF YOUR MOTIONS. ANYTHING FURTHER? 
MR. MILLER: NO. 
THE COURTS ALL RIGHT. LET'S GO BACK OUT. 
